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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze how motherhood affects women’s wages. Using a dataset from 
Russia we adopt a matching technique to account for possible selection effects. Our findings 
indicate that mothers tend to suffer a moderate wage penalty. We also confine our analysis to 
sector-specific effects and find that the negative effect may primarily be attributed to mothers 
working in the public sector. The differences across sectors may be explained by considerable 
job flexibility and a system of promotion based on work experience which has been adopted 
in the public sector.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper presents new evidence on how labour markets respond to motherhood by 
exploring the effects of motherhood on wages. The wage differentials between mothers and 
non-mothers have often been referred to as the “family gap” and have received a lot of 
attention from economists, sociologists and policy makers. Recent trends show that while the 
overall wage gap between males and females is declining over time, the wage gap between 
mothers and non-mothers is widening (Waldfogel, 1998). Empirical estimates suggest that the 
wage penalty for motherhood may be as large as 10-15% and could be even larger than the 
gender wage gap (Korenman and Neumark, 1991). 
It is important to study the wage penalty for motherhood for a number of reasons 
related to gender inequality. Women tend to pay a disproportionately high price for 
childbearing and child-rearing activities. Recent research has shown that the effect of having 
children on wages is strongly negative for mothers but positive for fathers (e.g. Lundberg and 
Rose, 2000). The latter factor may have a pronounced effect on other aspects of gender 
inequality, for example, bargaining power in the household or disparity in lifetime earnings. 
Moreover, raising children is important from the social point of view and should be 
encouraged, thus appropriate policies should be introduced in order to eliminate the 
motherhood penalty (Folbre, 1994). 
There are several theories which aim to explain the persistence of the “family gap”. 
Human capital theory suggests that more productive workers should be paid higher wages and 
an individual’s productivity depends positively on the level of human capital, such as formal 
education, vocational training and work experience. It is often suggested that the wage penalty 
for having children exists due to the fact that mothers have lower levels of human capital. 
Anderson et al. (2003) report that in the U.S.A. mothers had almost one year less of formal 
schooling compared to non-mothers. In addition to having low levels of education, mothers 
are likely to accumulate less vocational training and work experience due to career 
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interruptions (e.g. Budig and England, 2001). More importantly, as a consequence of 
motherhood a lot of women do not return to a full-time job, choosing to work part-time 
instead (e.g. Anderson et al, 2003; Strober and Chan, 1999). Empirical research found a 4-9% 
wage penalty for mothers after controlling for the level of human capital and experience 
(Waldfogel, 1998).  
Another rationale for the existence of the motherhood wage penalty comes from the 
work-effort theory. According to this theory, women cannot deliver full effort at work due to 
the disproportionately large burden of family responsibilities. Becker (1981, 1985) points out 
that these family responsibilities limit career developments and thus suppress the wage 
growth of mothers. In this view, even holding the stock of human capital equal between 
mothers and non-mothers, mothers would earn less due to the primary responsibilities for 
childcare and other house work. Becker suggests that women self-select themselves into 
occupations that are family-friendly and require less effort, which often pay less. Empirical 
evidence of work-effort and the wage penalty for mothers is mixed. Budig and England 
(2001) did not find any sizeable effect on the wage penalty resulting from mothers’ 
occupations and the effort associated with these choices. In contrast, Anderson et al. (2003) 
report that the wage penalty tends to decrease as the age of the children rises, which could 
potentially indicate that as children grow older and become more independent, mothers can 
devote more energy to work. A large amount of empirical research is devoted to occupational 
segregation, when mothers are assumed to select occupations that are potentially family-
friendly. For example, Nielsen et al. (2004) find that women self-select themselves into the 
public sector in order to avoid excessive wage penalties for having children.  
A final possibility is that the low wages of mothers could be driven by discrimination 
in the labour market. Statistical discrimination occurs if employers use motherhood as a 
screening device in hiring or promotions, assuming that mothers are less productive and 
should therefore be paid less. Alternatively, an employer might find it “distasteful” to hire a 
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mother for reasons other than productivity. Although any type of discrimination is prohibited 
by law, there is no clear-cut method in empirical research to detect the possible scope of 
discrimination.  
The aim of this study is to further investigate the current effects of having children on 
the wage penalty and to bring attention to this issue in the context of Russia. To our 
knowledge the effects of motherhood on labour income has not yet been investigated in 
Russia and relatively little research has been conducted for transition economies in general. 
We fill the gap in the knowledge by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the motherhood 
wage penalty using the NOBUS data set recently collected in Russia (see Ovcharova and 
Tesliuc (2005) for a description of the dataset).1 We implement propensity score matching 
and attempt to take into account the fact that some variables, such as education and 
experience may be predetermined with respect to motherhood.  Moreover, following 
Simonsen and Skipper (2006) we estimate a model of sector choice and the decision to 
become a mother simultaneously, thus presenting estimates of the motherhood wage penalty 
in the public and the private sectors.2  
The next section presents a brief review of the research on the gender wage gap in 
transition economies and describes the data. Section 3 outlines the methodology and describes 
the matching algorithm used in the paper. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the 
estimation. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses the limitations of the presented 
analysis.  
 
2. Background 
Historically, the labour force participation of women in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been high by international standards. Prior to 
                                                 
1 The survey is representative for 47 out of 89 subjects (regions) of the Russian Federation and covers 72% of 
the total population of the country (more information on NOBUS is available at: http://nobus.worldbank.org.ru). 
2 Beblo et al. (2006) also use matching estimator to investigate the motherhood wage penalty 
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the beginning of transition women’s labour force participation ranged from 65% to 85% and 
was only marginally lower than that of the male labour force. From the start of economic 
transition women’s labour force participation began to decline primarily due to the rise in 
unemployment. The gender wage gap, however, has remained relatively stable over the past 
years, amounting to 25% – 30% (Gerry et al., 2004) A number of papers have aimed at 
explaining the relatively stable gender wage gap in transition economies (e.g. Glinskaya and 
Morz (2000), Hunt (2002), Newell and Reilly (1996 and 2000)). One of the explanations 
which were put forward regarding the existence of the gender wage gap is occupational 
segregation. Jurajda (2003) investigates gender-specific occupational segregation in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics; Ogloblin (1999) performs a similar analysis for the case of Russia. 
Both studies conclude that the existing gender segregation is an important factor which 
contributes to the overall gender wage gap. Wage differentials between the private and public 
sectors in Russia were addressed by Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) using the Moscow labour 
force survey. The authors estimate the gap between the public and the private sector to be 
around 14% for men and 18% for women. Moreover, they indicate that, compared to men, 
women face a larger wage penalty in the public sector than in the private sector.3 Although 
undoubtedly important, none of the reviewed studies has focused so far on another aspect of 
earnings inequality – a gap due to motherhood. We fill the gap in the existing literature on the 
wage penalty in transition economies and contribute to the emerging discussion of gender 
segregation between the public and the private sector.  
This study is based on the Sample Survey of Household Welfare and Participation in 
Social Programs, also known as the NOBUS for its Russian acronym. The survey was carried 
out by the Russian Statistical Agency with the assistance of the World Bank. The survey was 
conducted in the second quarter of 2003 and covers 44,529 households. 
                                                 
3 It is important to bear in mind that the authors’ estimates are based on information related to the capital and can 
not necessarily be used to make a generalization for Russia as a whole.  
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For the purpose of our study we restrict our sample to women aged 18-49 who 
reported positive wages and hours worked, who are not self-employed and not undertaken 
education. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the chosen variables in the sample for 
mothers and non-mothers. We define a mother as a woman who reports having a child who 
lives with her in the same household, 58.8% of the women in our sample have children.4 The 
outcome of interest in the analysis is the log monthly wage after tax.5 It is seen that the 
average wage of non-mothers differs from that of mothers. It is also clear from Table 1 that 
non-mothers differ significantly from mothers in terms of observable characteristics: mothers 
are older; they have more work experience and they are also more likely to be better educated. 
Furthermore, mothers are likely to live in rural areas and, not surprisingly, to be married.  
 
3. Evaluation approach 
The objective of our evaluation analysis is to measure the impact of treatment D on the 
outcome Y. In our case the treatment is having children and the outcome is the logarithm of 
the monthly wage. Let  and  be the outcomes in two states, , no children and 
, some children respectively. Then the person-specific wage impact of having children 
is defined as . The problem is that it is not possible to observe outcomes in two 
states for the same person simultaneously. The problem of unobserved outcomes could easily 
be solved if we were able to conduct a control experiment, randomly assigning participation 
in the programme. Random assignment would ensure full comparability of participants and 
non-participants. Then the effect of the programme could be calculated as a simple average 
difference between outcomes. Unfortunately, the experimental approach is impossible to 
implement in our case for obvious reasons. Since randomisation is not possible, one can use 
1Y
iY1
0Y 0=D
1=D
ii Y0 −=Δ
                                                 
4 It is possible that some children in the household are stepchildren.  
5 Some may argue that the concept of the monthly wage is not appropriate. According to this argument, the 
hourly wage would yield a more accurate assessment of the wage structure. However, we chose the monthly 
wage since wages in Russia are usually paid on a monthly basis. Moreover, by restricting ourselves to a monthly 
wage we minimize measurement error self-reported hours worked.  
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non-experimental data to construct a counterfactual situation. However, the decision to 
become a mother is unlikely to be random, but might rather be governed by some observed 
characteristics. Since mothers and non-mothers are likely to be different, it is necessary to 
construct an appropriate estimator. The estimator used here was based on a statistical 
matching procedure which tries to mimic a controlled experiment. An important contribution 
to the literature on matching methods was Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983, 1984) seminal 
papers. They proposed statistical matching on the basis of the predicted probability of being 
treated i.e., propensity score, p(Xi), where Xi is a vector of observed individual characteristics.  
The propensity score can be estimated using logistic regression and has the property 
that, if all relevant covariates were included in its estimation, matching could be performed on 
the basis of the propensity score alone. An important assumption made in order to justify 
propensity score matching is that all relevant differences in outcomes are captured by the 
observed variables, and that no unobserved characteristics influence the decision to 
participate. This is the so-called conditional-independence assumption (CIA), which means 
that conditional on p(Xi), participation and outcome are assumed to be independent. 
We choose to estimate Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) since we are 
interested in the effect of motherhood on those women who already have children. Using CIA 
and the fact that  we can define ATT as:  1)(0 << iXp
{ }
[ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }1|)(,0|)0()(,1|)1(
)(,1|)0()1(
1|)0()1(
)( ==−==
=−=
=−=Δ
iiiiiiiXp
CIA
iiii
iiiATT
DXpDYEXpDYEE
XpDYYEE
DYYE
 
A potential problem of our set-up is the existence of explanatory variables which are 
potentially affected by the treatment. Rosenbaum (1984) examines the consequences of 
including potentially predetermined variables in the estimation and concludes that such 
adjustment results in unbiased estimates only if the variables are not affected by the treatment. 
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Furthermore, Robins and Greenland (1992) point out that in the presence of predetermined 
covariates the identification of the effect becomes problematic. 
One of the variables that are presumably affected by motherhood is sector choice. The 
choice between work in the public or the private sector may be affected by the presence of 
children and may simultaneously affect wages. In a recent study Simonsen and Skipper 
(2006) suggest estimating the propensity score using a bivariate probit model of sector choice 
and the fertility decision in order to assess the impact of motherhood and sector choice 
simultaneously. In the following sections we adopt the approach of Simonsen and Skipper 
(2006) assuming sector choice to be predetermined with respect to fertility.  
 
4. Propensity score matching  
We first estimate the standard probability model to determine the propensity score for 
becoming a mother.6 For the estimation of the propensity score we select variables which are 
certainly not affected by the treatment. The set of explanatory variables includes age, regional 
identifiers and area dummies. We also include education dummies assuming that in most of 
the cases they are not affected by motherhood. The results are presented in Table 2. As 
expected, the probability of becoming a mother increases with age and declines with the size 
of the area in which the individual is living. We also find that women with a postgraduate 
degree face the lowest probability of becoming a mother. The model predicts relatively well: 
76% of all the observations are predicted correctly and the pseudo 2R  equals 0.172. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of the propensity score for both mothers and non-mothers. It is seen 
from the graph that propensity scores of mothers are more concentrated around high values 
compared to the propensity scores of non-mothers. Note that most of the observations lie in 
the area of common support, i.e. it is possible to find a match for mothers even for the highest 
propensity score values.  
                                                 
6 We choose to estimate a standard probit model.  
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As we mentioned above, in our sample mothers differ from non-mothers in observed 
characteristics. Thus, a direct comparison of wages for these groups is incorrect since any 
disparities may be caused by other observed characteristics, such as age and/or educational 
mismatch. 
We first perform matching based solely on the propensity score; this should give us 
the net effect of being a mother.7 The net effect includes the direct effect of being a mother as 
well as indirect effects resulting from the reduced labour market experience and/or the higher 
probability of working in the public sector. Thus, the net effect measures the total costs of 
being a mother, resulting from all contaminant variables. The results of the estimation of the 
net effect are presented in the middle column of Table 4. The net effect of being a mother is 
negative. Mothers in general earn 4% less than non-mothers. To test the balance of covariates, 
or to check that the means of the variables used in the estimation of the propensity score do 
not differ between the treatment and control groups, we implement a balancing test as 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The results are presented in Table 3. Using a 
matched sample we conclude that most of the observed differences in the values of the 
covariates were eliminated after matching, for example we eliminated large covariate 
imbalances related to the age distribution of mothers and non-mothers.  
We next proceed to the estimation of the direct effect of motherhood: the direct effect 
measures the effect of motherhood free of the effect of other variables. To measure this we 
use a regression-adjusted method as suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2002) and Abadie et al 
(2001). The regression-adjusted method adjusts the difference within the matches for the 
difference in the values of their covariates and is performed using the ordinary least squares 
procedure on the matched observations.8 We make the adjustment based on the work 
                                                 
7 We estimate the effect using a single nearest one to one matching method. 
8 To estimate the direct effect, following Simonsen and Skipper (2006), we need to assume additive separability 
of the outcome equation and that the effect of unobservable in the outcome equation is mean independent of 
variables that are potentially affected by the treatment conditional on the variables that are included in the 
estimation of the propensity score.  
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experience and individual occupation. The results of the estimations are presented in the right-
hand column of Table 4. As before we find that being a mother has a negative effect on 
wages. This adjusted effect is smaller, however, compared to the non-adjusted effect. After 
controlling for experience and occupation mothers on average earn 3% less than non-mothers. 
An important variable which is left out of the analysis is the sector in which the 
woman is employed. To account for the sector choice we adopt the methodology proposed by 
Simonsen and Skipper (2006) and estimate a bivariate probit of sector choice and 
motherhood. The results are presented in Table 5. Based on the results of the estimation we 
predict a joint probability of being a mother and working in the private or public sector. When 
modelling the sector selection we condition on the motherhood indicator, type of education, 
region and place of residence. Comparing Table 5 and Table 2 it is obvious that the 
coefficients in the motherhood equation remained unaffected, while, as expected, the results 
from the sector choice equation (Table 5) confirm our hypothesis that mothers are less likely 
to work in the private sector. We next proceed to estimate the joint impact of motherhood and 
sector choice. As before we estimate both the net and the direct effects of motherhood.  
Rows 2-3 of Table 4 present the results from the estimation taking into account the 
endogeneity of sector choice. A striking feature of the analysis is that estimates of the 
motherhood wage penalty clearly differ depending on the sector choice. We observe a 
relatively small positive and significant net effect for mothers in the private sector, while the 
net effect of being a mother in the public sector does not differ statistically from zero. 
Moreover after performing regression adjustment we observe that the penalty for having 
children and working in the public sector increases to 8% and is statistically significant. At 
the same time the direct effect of motherhood and employment in the private sector is smaller 
in absolute terms but remains positive, though statistically insignificant. 
It is important to mention that the net effect cannot be used to conclude that being a 
mother is more “expensive” in the public sector. To a large degree the differences may reflect 
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that women in the private sector make different choices with respect to working hours, effort, 
occupation compared to women in the public sector. An alternative explanation comes from 
the fact that in the public sector promotion is often based on the seniority principle, thus 
mothers who spend some time on maternity leave may be disadvantaged in terms of their 
career prospects and salary increase. Moreover, greater job flexibility in the public sector may 
make it possible for mothers to relocate to more “family-friendly” positions which allow 
flexible or reduced working hours along with fewer career and pay prospects.  
Our finding of a moderate yet insignificant direct wage gain in the private sector may 
be somewhat surprising. One explanation is that a mother who chooses to remain in the 
private sector increases her work effort believing that she would otherwise be discriminated. 
However, discrimination in the private sector does not exist or is relatively rare and thus the 
woman is able to offset it and to contribute to her wage growth. Another explanation comes 
from the fact that private employers may actually discriminate young non-mothers, believing 
that they may soon have a child and use their maternity leave. Finally, the wage premium for 
motherhood in the private sector may be interpreted as a compensation for low flexibility and 
higher disutility of work for mothers.  
How does our result relate to previous findings on a motherhood wage penalty? As we 
mentioned before we are not aware of a study which investigates the motherhood penalty in 
Russia or any transition economy. However, in comparison to the wage penalty of 7% - 13% 
found in studies for western Europe and the USA, our finding of an overall 4% penalty seems 
relatively low (see Ellwood, 2004). The relatively moderate wage penalty may be explained 
by the relatively well-developed system of child care inherited from the former Soviet Union. 
Moreover, a surprising result that emerges from our study is that mothers who work in the 
public sector are penalized to a greater extent compared to mothers working in the private 
sector. Similar results were obtained for Denmark by Simonsen and Skipper (2006), who used 
similar methodology to study the impact of motherhood and sector choice.  
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 5. Conclusion  
Eliminating the motherhood wage penalty is undoubtedly important because of the 
equality issues. Moreover, it is in the best interest of society to utilise fully the abilities that 
women provide and to reward them accordingly. 
In this paper we provide first evidence of the motherhood wage penalty in Russia and 
investigate an important aspect of heterogeneity related to a sector choice made by mothers. 
Our findings indicate the presence of a moderate wage penalty of 4% - less than previously 
found for other countries. Despite a prevailing belief that public sector work is family-
friendly, it is evident that most of the wage penalty is borne by women working in the public 
sector. We estimate the wage penalty of mothers working in the public sector to be 8%; at the 
same time we find a positive but small and insignificant premium for being a mother working 
in the private sector. However, this does not necessarily contradict the notion of a “family-
friendly” job, but rather highlights the relative flexibility in terms of work load that mothers 
can choose to take in the public sector.  
Russian social policy is at a crossroads. After a period of economic stagnation, an 
economic upheaval and a shift in policy attracted attention to fertility problems. Several 
measures have recently been put forward to encourage childbearing. These measures include 
monetary transfers and state subsidies. However, little attention has been paid to the issues of 
poor labour protection for mothers and the existence of a wage gap. Our study is the first 
attempt to draw attention to these issues and may provide a new venue for research.
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables  
 
Variables 
Full 
sample  
Non-
mothers 
41.24% 
Mothers 
 
58.76% 
  18,364 26,165 
    
Wage 3051.37 3175.23 2964.43 
    
Age 36.17 35.52 36.64 
18 Age<25 ≤ 10.96 23.27 2.33 
25 Age<30 ≤ 15.30 15.10 15.43 
30 Age<35 ≤ 14.54 5.55 20.85 
35 Age<40 ≤ 16.18 5.92 23.38 
40 Age<50 ≤ 43.02 50.16 38.01 
    
Education    
No education or incomplete primary  0.41 0.59 0.29 
Primary  4.49 5.07 4.09 
Less than secondary 18.17 18.90 17.65 
Secondary 7.57 7.08 7.91 
Initial vocational secondary  3.95 4.06 3.88 
Advanced vocational secondary  37.18 34.87 38.81 
Incomplete university  5.01 6.01 4.31 
University 23.03 23.17 22.96 
Postgraduate 0.18 0.28 0.10 
    
Size of place of residence     
Over 1 million 18.28 23.37 14.72 
1 million – 250,000 20.26 21.04 19.72 
250,000 – 20,000 28.17 28.37 28.03 
Small town 12.58 12.50 12.63 
Village 20.71 14.73 24.90 
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Table 2 
Coefficient estimates and asy. std. err. from motherhood probit 
Dep. variable: 1 Mothers. 0 Non-mothers 
Full Sample 
Variables  Coefficients Std. deviation 
   
Age   
18 Age<25 ≤ -1.219*** 0.062 
25 Age<30 ≤ 0.204*** 0.044 
30 Age<35 ≤ 0.976*** 0.069 
35 Age<40 ≤ 0.976*** 0.059 
40 Age<50 ≤ - - 
   
Education   
No ed. or incomplete primary  0.453 0.384 
Primary  0.609 0.326 
Less than secondary 0.658* 0.319 
Secondary 0.725* 0.322 
Initial vocational secondary 0.721* 0.326 
Advanced vocational 
secondary 
0.659* 0.318 
Incomplete university  0.658* 0.325 
University 0.640* 0.318 
Postgraduate - - 
   
Regions   
Region 1 -0.029 0.168 
Region 2 0.062 0.162 
Region 3 0.231 0.159 
Region 4 0.064 0.159 
Region 5 0.082 0.160 
Region 6 0.131 0.203 
Region 7 0.326* 0.163 
Region 8 0.184 0.169 
Region 9 -0.011 0.175 
Region 10 0.393* 0.168 
Region 11 0.077 0.164 
   
Size of place of residence    
Over 1 million -0.573*** 0.063 
1 million – 250,000 -0.368*** 0.051 
250,000 – 20,000 -0.302*** 0.051 
Small town -0.259** 0.081 
Village - - 
Constant -0.405 0.356 
Log-likelihood -85243459 
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Table 3 
Covariates imbalance after matching 
Mean and standardized difference in percentage points  
                        Mean  
Variable   Treated Control % bias
Age   
18 Age<25 ≤ Unmatched 0.02587 0.20535 -58.5
 Matched 0.02588 0.02616 -0.1
     
25 Age<30 ≤ Unmatched 0.1573 0.15587 0.4
 Matched 0.15733 0.1528 1.2
     
30 Age<35 ≤ Unmatched 0.21282 0.05757 46.6
 Matched 0.21286 0.20096 3.6
     
40 Age<50 ≤ Unmatched 0.23359 0.05988 50.6
 Matched 0.23345 0.24762 -4.1
     
Education     
No ed. or incomplete primary Unmatched 0.0034 0.00347 -0.1
 Matched 0.0034 0.00085 4.4
     
Primary  Unmatched 0.04362 0.04202 0.8
 Matched 0.04363 0.03589 3.8
     
Less than secondary Unmatched 0.1793 0.18337 -1.1
 Matched 0.17934 0.16791 3
     
Secondary Unmatched 0.0728 0.0708 0.8
 Matched 0.07262 0.07716 -1.8
     
Initial vocational secondary Unmatched 0.03191 0.03418 -1.3
 Matched 0.03192 0.02965 1.3
     
Advanced vocational secondary  Unmatched 0.39307 0.36816 5.1
 Matched 0.39314 0.41553 -4.6
     
Incomplete university Unmatched 0.03918 0.05269 -6.5
 Matched 0.03919 0.03154 3.7
     
University Unmatched 0.23577 0.24274 -1.6
 Matched 0.23581 0.2411 -1.2
     
Region     
Region1 Unmatched 0.04069 0.05757 -7.8
 Matched 0.0407 0.03608 2.1
     
Region2 Unmatched 0.16599 0.20059 -9
 Matched 0.16602 0.17339 -1.9
     
Region3 Unmatched 0.14267 0.12208 6.1
 Matched 0.1427 0.14543 -0.8
     
Region4 Unmatched 0.16429 0.16564 -0.4
 Matched 0.16432 0.16073 1
     
Region5 Unmatched 0.09716 0.10357 -2.1
 Matched 0.09718 0.0951 0.7
     
Region6 Unmatched 0.01671 0.01812 -1.1
 Matched 0.01672 0.01738 -0.5
 18
     
Region7 Unmatched 0.1371 0.10897 8.6
 Matched 0.13712 0.13996 -0.9
     
Region8 Unmatched 0.06288 0.05474 3.5
 Matched 0.0629 0.06337 -0.2
     
Region9 Unmatched 0.03475 0.03213 1.5
 Matched 0.03475 0.03674 -1.1
     
Region10 Unmatched 0.03569 0.02557 5.9
 Matched 0.03551 0.03674 3.5
Size     
     
Over 1 million Unmatched 0.08063 0.13634 -18
 Matched 0.08065 0.08141 -0.2
     
1 million – 250,000 Unmatched 0.21027 0.25765 -11.2
 Matched 0.21031 0.21928 -2.1
     
Small town Unmatched 0.27826 0.28515 -1.5
 Matched 0.27831 0.27632 0.4
     
Village Unmatched 0.14597 0.12709 5.5
 Matched 0.146 0.14109 1.4
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Table 4 
Comparison of estimated ATT 
Dependent variable log monthly wage 
 Net effect Direct effect 
Overall -0.040 
(0.0144 ) 
- 0.029 
(0.0141) 
Mother and private 0.0334 
(0.0154) 
0.020 
(0.0148) 
Mother and public 0.0229 
(0.0179) 
-0.085 
(0.0174) 
Note: Different design of control groups was used in estimation. First row: All non-mothers; 
Second row: All non-mothers and mothers working in the public sector; Third row: 
All non-mothers and mothers working in the private sector. 
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Table 5 
Coefficient estimates and asy. std. err.  
Motherhood and sector bivariate probit 
 Private sector Motherhood 
 Coefficients Std. deviation t-stat Coefficients Std. deviation t-stat
Age      
18 Age<25 ≤    -1.23 0.06 -19.62
25 Age<30 ≤    0.19 0.05 4.09
30 Age<35 ≤    0.97 0.07 14.12
35 Age<40 ≤    0.97 0.06 16.37
    
Child -0.17 0.08 -2.18    
  
Education  
No ed. or incomplete primary  0.34 0.57 0.60 0.45 0.39 1.16
Primary  0.61 0.49 1.25 0.61 0.33 1.85
Less than secondary 0.60 0.49 1.22 0.66 0.32 2.05
Secondary 0.46 0.49 0.94 0.72 0.32 2.23
Initial vocational secondary  0.58 0.49 1.17 0.72 0.33 2.19
Advanced vocational secondary  0.34 0.49 0.69 0.66 0.32 2.05
Incomplete university  0.38 0.49 0.76 0.66 0.33 2.02
University  0.09 0.49 0.18 0.64 0.32 1.99
Postgraduate - - - - - -
Region  
reg1 -0.69 0.08 -8.65 -0.10 0.08 -1.28
reg2 -0.12 0.06 -2.17 -0.01 0.07 -0.11
reg3 -0.06 0.06 -0.92 0.16 0.07 2.44
reg4 0.03 0.06 0.41 -0.01 0.07 -0.08
reg5 0.04 0.06 0.67 0.01 0.07 0.19
reg6 -0.04 0.14 -0.25 0.06 0.14 0.44
reg7 -0.12 0.07 -1.64 0.26 0.08 3.45
reg8 0.11 0.08 1.32 0.12 0.09 1.31
reg9 -0.50 0.10 -5.16 -0.08 0.10 -0.78
reg10 -0.67 0.10 -6.92 0.32 0.09 3.57
  
Size of place of residence  
>1 million 0.19 0.06 3.10 -0.57 0.06 -9.07
1million – 250,000 0.35 0.05 7.07 -0.37 0.05 -7.24
250,000 – 20,000 0.20 0.05 3.98 -0.30 0.05 -5.93
Small town -0.05 0.07 -0.79 -0.26 0.08 -3.19
Constant -0.82 0.49 -1.67 -0.33 0.33 -1.01
Log-likelihood -85243459 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the propensity score 
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